ScoreGuard Know Your VASP report · KYV-5b5d2bdbc6ec · generated 2026-09-13T20:52:28+00:00

Data source: none · desk + on-chain review · scale 1–100, lower is riskier · 0 of 1 clustered address(es) screened

Re-run now VASP directory

39of 100

Know Your VASP report Severe risk

StreetSwap Broker

Unlicensed P2p · incorporated in Venezuela · founded 2019 · attribution: synthetic

Desk review26

On-chain review50

Cluster volume 0

StreetSwap Broker is a unlicensed p2p incorporated in Venezuela, assessed at 39/100 (severe risk) from a desk review of 26/100 and an on-chain review of 50/100. Licence status is unlicensed with none evidence (no identified regulator), MiCA not authorised, KYC rigour none, Travel Rule absent. The largest single deduction is 24 points for counterparty controls: non-custodial protocol: no customer identification, Travel Rule or monitoring programme is possible. No clustered wallet could be screened, so the on-chain half of the score falls back to a neutral 50. No identified licence; onboarding requires senior sign-off and ongoing monitoring.

Combined score weights the desk review at 45% and the on-chain review at 55%, because chain evidence is observed while the regulatory file is asserted.

What this assessment rests on

45% of the score is a desk review of the regulatory file. Licence status, controls and monitoring maturity are asserted in the directory record rather than observed on chain, and no attribution measurement grades them. This directory record is a demonstration entry, so the paperwork it describes belongs to no real business.

55% of the score is the on-chain review, and none of the 1 clustered address(es) could be screened, so that half falls back to a neutral 50 and rests on no observed evidence.

The attribution figure covers the on-chain review only. There is no single coverage percentage for this score, because the desk review half is not measured over counterparty value.

Regulatory file

Legal name	StreetSwap Broker
Trading name	StreetSwap Broker
Licence status	unlicensed (none evidence)
Regulator	no identified regulator
Licence reference	—
MiCA status	not authorised
Jurisdiction	Venezuela (VE), risk 6/10 · FATF grey list
Operational hubs	CY, MT, VE

Controls

KYC rigour	none · No identity verification identified.
Withdrawal KYC threshold	no verification
Travel Rule	absent · No Travel Rule capability identified.
Transaction monitoring	absent
Sanctions screening	none identified
Source of funds checks	not performed
Custody model	non custodial

Desk review deductions

74.5 points deducted from 100.

Counterparty controls -24.0 pts

non-custodial protocol: no customer identification, Travel Rule or monitoring programme is possible

Licence status -22.0 pts

unlicensed — no identified regulator

MiCA status -9.0 pts

MiCA not authorised

Licence evidence -8.0 pts

licence evidence is none

Jurisdiction -7.0 pts

Venezuela is on the FATF grey list

Jurisdiction risk -4.5 pts

Venezuela carries jurisdiction risk 6/10

On-chain review of the provider's clusters

Clustered addresses 1

Wallets screened 0

Inbound 0

Outbound 0

Illicit share 0.0%

Insufficient attribution · 0.0% of traced value

No counterparty value was traced, so the score reflects no observed exposure rather than an absence of risk.

Measured over the counterparties of the screened clustered wallets. It grades the on-chain half of the score only, not the desk review.

0 of 0 counterparties (0.0%) resolve to an identified entity. This screen cannot auto-clear: attribution is below the sufficient floor (70% of traced value). Unattributed exposure is penalised: the 'unknown' category carries a 4.0-point penalty at full exposure, reached at a 60% share. A wallet with mostly unidentified counterparties loses points for that. A clean-looking score still cannot auto-clear below the sufficient attribution floor.

Risk composition of managed wallets

No on-chain activity was returned for the clustered wallets.

Screened wallets

Address	Chain	Score	Risk	Inbound	Outbound	Transfers	Source
3TRMgcrDgRiKDhhK8VDSEAjFdKYLCd34G9	Bitcoin	—	provider error (ProviderError)

Compliance and provenance

Travel Rule	counterparty not ready · No Travel Rule capability identified.
Data source	none · 0 of 1 clustered address(es) screened
Directory	41 VASP profiles, 2463 labelled entities

Label sources

Sanctions: 943 designated addresses from the US Treasury OFAC SDN list, published 08/28/2026.
Token contracts: 927 identified from public token lists.
Cited public labels: 519 addresses from 34 source(s), each with a URL.
- Aave address book: V3 Ethereum (98 addresses) — https://aave-dao.github.io/aave-address-book/api/v1/modules/AaveV3Ethereum.json
- FBI/IC3 PSA: North Korea responsible for $1.5 billion Bybit hack (51 addresses) — https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2025/PSA250226
- Aave address book: AaveV3Polygon (45 addresses) — https://aave-dao.github.io/aave-address-book/api/v1/modules/AaveV3Polygon.json
- Aave address book: V2 Ethereum (40 addresses) — https://aave-dao.github.io/aave-address-book/api/v1/modules/AaveV2Ethereum.json
- Aave address book: AaveV3Arbitrum (39 addresses) — https://aave-dao.github.io/aave-address-book/api/v1/modules/AaveV3Arbitrum.json
- Aave address book: AaveV3Optimism (31 addresses) — https://aave-dao.github.io/aave-address-book/api/v1/modules/AaveV3Optimism.json
- Aave address book: AaveV3Base (25 addresses) — https://aave-dao.github.io/aave-address-book/api/v1/modules/AaveV3Base.json
- Tornado Cash smart contracts (24 addresses) — https://docs.tornado.cash/general/tornado-cash-smart-contracts
- Bybit: wallet addresses ownership explained (21 addresses) — https://www.bybit.com/en/help-center/article/Bybit-Wallet-Addresses-Ownership-Explained
- Circle CCTP EVM contract addresses (20 addresses) — https://developers.circle.com/cctp/evm-smart-contracts
- Aave address book: AaveV3BNB (18 addresses) — https://aave-dao.github.io/aave-address-book/api/v1/modules/AaveV3BNB.json
- Bitfinex: published public wallets (16 addresses) — https://github.com/bitfinexcom/pub/blob/main/wallets.txt
- Aave address book: AaveV2Polygon (16 addresses) — https://aave-dao.github.io/aave-address-book/api/v1/modules/AaveV2Polygon.json
- Aave address book: AaveV3EthereumLido (12 addresses) — https://aave-dao.github.io/aave-address-book/api/v1/modules/AaveV3EthereumLido.json
- Crypto.com: Transparency First cold-wallet list (10 addresses) — https://crypto.com/en/company-news/transparency-first
- Uniswap v3 Arbitrum deployments (7 addresses) — https://docs.uniswap.org/contracts/v3/reference/deployments/arbitrum-deployments
- Uniswap v3 Optimism deployments (7 addresses) — https://docs.uniswap.org/contracts/v3/reference/deployments/optimism-deployments
- Uniswap v3 Polygon deployments (7 addresses) — https://docs.uniswap.org/contracts/v3/reference/deployments/polygon-deployments
- Lido deployed contracts (6 addresses) — https://docs.lido.fi/deployed-contracts/
- Uniswap v3 Base deployments (6 addresses) — https://docs.uniswap.org/contracts/v3/reference/deployments/base-deployments
- Uniswap v3 Ethereum deployments (3 addresses) — https://docs.uniswap.org/contracts/v3/reference/deployments/ethereum-deployments
- Chainalysis: Euler Finance flash loan attack (2 addresses) — https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/euler-finance-flash-loan-attack/
- Morpho deployed contracts (2 addresses) — https://docs.morpho.org/get-started/resources/addresses
- Compound III USDC Ethereum roots (2 addresses) — https://github.com/compound-finance/comet/blob/main/deployments/mainnet/usdc/roots.json
- Aave address book: GhoEthereum (2 addresses) — https://aave-dao.github.io/aave-address-book/api/v1/modules/GhoEthereum.json
- Railgun privacy system contracts (1 address) — https://docs.railgun.org/wiki/learn/helpful-links
- Linea network contracts (1 address) — https://docs.linea.build/network/build/contracts
- Starknet L1-L2 messaging (1 address) — https://docs.starknet.io/documentation/architecture_and_concepts/Network_Architecture/l1-l2-messaging/
- Chainalysis: Wormhole hack February 2022 (1 address) — https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/wormhole-hack-february-2022/
- Compound III USDS Ethereum roots (1 address) — https://github.com/compound-finance/comet/blob/main/deployments/mainnet/usds/roots.json
- Compound III USDT Ethereum roots (1 address) — https://github.com/compound-finance/comet/blob/main/deployments/mainnet/usdt/roots.json
- Compound III WBTC Ethereum roots (1 address) — https://github.com/compound-finance/comet/blob/main/deployments/mainnet/wbtc/roots.json
- Compound III WETH Ethereum roots (1 address) — https://github.com/compound-finance/comet/blob/main/deployments/mainnet/weth/roots.json
- Compound III WSTETH Ethereum roots (1 address) — https://github.com/compound-finance/comet/blob/main/deployments/mainnet/wsteth/roots.json
Demonstration data: excluded — 118 synthetic entities were not scored.

Screen window

Up to 500 transfers across 3 indexer page(s) · default 3 hops · hop-2 budget 16 · hop-3 budget 12.

Artefact integrity

sha256+hmac · SHA-256 25e74c02ebbc9c5cde79a4290b9743a7c1cd4938571f21efe48b77d82a390d60 · sealed 2026-09-13T20:52:28+00:00 · HMAC present.

Frameworks covered

FATF Recommendation 15 / 16 — Counterparty attribution and originator/beneficiary context.
EU MiCA (Regulation 2023/1114) — Risk assessment record for crypto-asset service providers.
EU AMLD / Transfer of Funds Regulation — Source and destination of funds with jurisdictional exposure.
OFAC sanctions programmes — Direct and cluster-level exposure to designated addresses.
FinCEN SAR / STR filing — Evidence pack: indicators, counterparties and transfer sample.

Informative

Notice / Disclaimer

Limits that apply to this artefact as a whole. Sources and hashes stay in provenance; this section is how to read them.

This due diligence profile describes a synthetic service provider from the seeded VASP directory. Licence references, regulators and control ratings are fabricated for demonstration and describe no real business.
Token-contract labels name contracts, not wallet owners.
Demonstration data was excluded — 118 synthetic entities were not scored.
Activity beyond the stated screen window is not in the score.
Recompute the sha256+hmac digest against the JSON export to confirm this copy matches what was stored.